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Western condemnation of Moscow’s involvement in the 2014 
Ukrainian conflict, including the annexation of Crimea and 
apparent Russian support for ongoing violent secessionist 
movements, and the carving out of the Donbas region of 
eastern Ukraine. Russian culpability assumed by Western 
governments in the Ukraine conflicts and the shooting down 
of a Malaysian civilian jetliner in the airspace over the dis-
puted zones by pro-Russian separatist forces in July 2014, 
rendered even more toxic relations between Russia on one 
side and Europe and the United States on the other. 
Although China viewed the events in Ukraine with alarm, 
and reiterated its longstanding policy that territorial sov-
ereignty of states be maintained, Beijing refrained from 
criticising Russian actions and did not support sanctions 
undertaken by the United States and Europe. In March 2014 
comments regarding the security situation in Ukraine, a Chi-
nese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that while Beijing 
recognised and respected the role of non-interference and 
international law, ‘we take into account the historical facts 
and realistic complexity of the Ukrainian issue.’1 
At the same time, China and Russia have increased their 
cooperation in multilateral regimes such as the BRICS 
grouping, which has begun to redefine its structures to 
include embryonic financial institutions, such as the New 
Development Bank (NDB), designed to counter existing 
Western-dominated regimes such as the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank. Despite a flurry of institution-
building in East Asia since the end of the cold war, it has only 
been in recent years that regimes which exclude the United 
States and its regional allies, often with core Sino-Russian 
cooperation, have become more prevalent, raising the ques-
tion of whether the region as a whole is seeing greater ‘rival 
Summary
Since Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed power, Sino-
Russian economic relations have greatly improved, with 
a concentration on building trade links which are less 
dependent on the West. During 2014, the ‘pivot to Asia’ 
policies under Russian President Vladimir Putin were ac-
celerated, while China proposed the ‘Silk Road Economic 
Belt’ in Eurasia and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ 
in the Indian Ocean. Both routes may serve to further unite 
Chinese and Russian economic and strategic interests. Yet 
a third road, namely the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the 
Arctic will also factor significantly into the deepening eco-
nomic ties between Beijing and Moscow as this maritime 
link between Asia and Europe becomes more frequently 
used. The NSR should be studied as the ‘third road’, which 
may link Chinese trade with Europe but also further im-
prove Sino-Russian economic relations. 
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Introduction: The ‘New Normal’ in Sino-Russian Rela-
tions
Since the Russian government under President Vladimir Putin 
announced its watershed ‘Pivot to Asia’ foreign policy initia-
tive in 2013, economic and strategic relationships between 
China and Russia have come under greater international 
scrutiny due to China’s growing need for energy and raw 
materials and Russian interests in tapping further into Asian 
economic growth potential. Moscow’s decision to deepen its 
diplomatic and economic relations with East Asia, especially 
with China, came as an acknowledgement that the centre 
of financial power in the international system had shifted 
to the Pacific Rim following the post-2008 global recession, 
and highlighted concerns in Russia that its relations with the 
West, including Europe, were beginning to sour. 
A similar situation was developing in US-Russia relations, 
despite initial optimism following a ‘reset’ policy, announced 
by President Obama during a July 2009 visit to Moscow. The 
defining issue in Russian relations with the West and the 
decision to engage Asia to a greater degree was undoubtedly 
1  ’Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Con-
ference on March 4, 2014,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 4 March 2014, 
 < h t t p: // w w w. f m p rc .go v.c n / m f a _ e ng / xw f w _ 6 6 5 3 9 9 /
s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1134077.shtml>
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regionalisms’ and regime divergences in Asia.2  On an inter-
national level, there has been a degree of policy coordination 
of international security issues, including over the conflict 
in Syria since 2011, which resulted in the frequent use of 
the ‘double veto’ by China and Russia at the United Nations 
Security Council. 
Nonetheless, despite a diplomatic warming between Beijing 
and Moscow, there is also a noticeable shift in power between 
the two. No longer is China assuming the role of ‘younger 
brother’ (didi弟弟) in the relationship as was the case during 
the middle of the twentieth century and prior to the Sino-
Soviet Split (zhongsu jiao’e 中苏交恶) in the 1960s. Instead, 
China has consistently maintained high rates of economic 
growth, even in the wake of the post-2008 financial down-
turn, and more recently has sought to translate its economic 
power into an expanded foreign policy in regions outside 
the Asia-Pacific region, including in Africa, Europe, Latin 
America and also within the Former Soviet Union (FSU). 
Moreover, Beijing has demonstrated greater confidence in its 
foreign policy and in its abilities to develop new institutions 
and regimes which better fit within China’s international 
interests. The announcement and initial development by 
Beijing of the ‘Silk Road’ trade conduit is the most ambitious 
testimony yet of China’s economic power, as well as the shift-
ing power dynamic between China and Russia. 
The Opening of the ‘Silk Roads’ (+ Arctic?) 
While the Putin government has sought to shield its economy 
from the damaging effects of Western sanctions following 
the Crimean and Eastern Ukraine conflicts, China under Xi 
Jinping sees Russia, including the Russian Far East (RFE) 
and other regions of the ex-USSR, as essential components 
in developing expanded trade routes between East Asia and 
European markets. President Xi’s proposals comprise a ‘one 
belt and one road’ (yidai yilu 一带一路) strategy of developing 
new land and sea links with vital Western European markets. 
Central to these new links is the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ 
(silu jingjidai丝路经济带), to stretch across Central Asia and 
the Caucasus and Bosporus regions, linking Moscow to ports 
in Northern Europe. In addition to trade, the creation of the 
‘belt’ would entail increased bilateral cooperation between 
Beijing and Central Asian and Caucasus states along with 
Russia, and stronger institutional engagement between the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a regional secu-
rity regime which includes Russia, China and Central Asian 
states, and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) 
which will give way in January 2015 to the new Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU).
These overland routes, similar to trade routes between 
Imperial China and Europe first established during the Han 
Dynasty more than two millennia ago, would be accompanied 
by a ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (haishang silu 海上丝路) or MSR, 
which would traverse the Indian Ocean with ports in Bang-
ladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Eastern Africa, and also involve 
the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Like its landlocked counterparts, the Maritime Silk 
Road has a long historical precedent in the form of Indian 
Ocean sea routes, traversed by Chinese vessels during the 
Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE), which linked the Tang Empire 
with the Byzantine Empire in south-eastern Europe and the 
Caliphates of southwest Asia, as well as eastern Africa and 
the Indian subcontinent. 
The development of the MSR, which would enhance China 
as a maritime actor in Asia following decades as primarily a 
‘continental’ power with a primary focus on securing land 
borders, was the result of a several successful diplomatic 
initiatives including a South Asia tour by President Xi in mid-
2014, as well as diplomatic initiatives which Chinese offi-
cials undertook in Southeast Asia during that year. The MSR 
project, in addition to its potential economic importance, 
suggests Beijing has become more open to the idea of an 
‘Indo-Pacific’ sphere beginning to develop as East and South 
Asian financial and strategic interests begin to converge. 
In addition, the implicit strategic value of the MSR would be 
a decrease in the risk of China being subject to a blockage 
of vital sea-lanes of communication (SLoCs) with a greater 
Chinese trade presence in the Indian Ocean. A decade ago, 
as China began to rely more heavily on imported goods, raw 
materials and fossil fuels shipped from Europe and Africa, 
concerns were raised about a ‘Malacca Dilemma’, namely the 
risk of Chinese maritime commerce being subject to interfer-
ence in the narrow Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia due to 
either piracy or direct interference by another government 
seeking to impede Chinese trade. These announcements 
confirm Beijing’s stronger confidence in both its power pro-
jection capabilities, and its ‘commercial diplomacy’, mean-
ing the ability to translate economic power into other forms, 
including in the strategic realm. The Silk Road initiatives may 
also mark a new phase in the economic relationship between 
Beijing on one side and Russia and Central Asia on the other. 
The central role of these enhanced trade and diplomatic 
pathways, according to Beijing, is to engage Russia and the 
developing economies of Central Asia and to draw European 
markets closer to Chinese interests. 
However, the warming economic relationship between China 
and Russia has met with  resistance further north, specifically 
in the Arctic, an area which has long been of interest to Mos-
cow but is also the focus of much recent economic interest 
from Beijing. China sees the RFE / Siberia as essential both 
as a source of potential resource trade and as a component of 
the Northern Sea Route (NSR) which Beijing seeks to exploit 
in developing its Eurasian trade. Russia, while welcoming 
Chinese trade, is growing concerned about the potential 
effects of Chinese economic power on its long-evolved Arctic 
sovereignty. Thus, while it is probable that Russian-Western 
2 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space 
Ellen L. Frost, ’Rival Regionalisms and Regional Order: A Slow Cri-
sis of Legitimacy?’ National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special 
Report #48 (December 2014), < http://www.nbr.org/publications/
specialreport/pdf/free/021115/SR48.pdf>.
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tensions may spill over into Far Northern affairs, a quieter but 
equally serious diplomatic competition may appear between 
Beijing and Moscow over how best to manage Chinese eco-
nomic power in the Russian Far East and Northeast. 
The North Remembers?
The Northeast Passage extends roughly parallel to the north-
ern coast of Siberia from the Bering Strait and Kamchatka 
Peninsula to the Barents Sea and the north-western Russian 
Arctic port city of Murmansk, and is viewed by many Asian 
economies, not only those of China but also of Japan and 
South Korea, as a viable short-cut for shipping to European 
markets. The likely increasing value of these routes has gal-
vanised Arctic states into considering improving infrastruc-
ture for handling increased maritime traffic. Until recently, 
the economic role of the passage was limited by Arctic ice 
making transit difficult and dangerous without capable 
icebreaking vessels. The Soviet Union / Russian Federation 
became the most prolific builder of such vessels, and cur-
rently operates forty-two icebreakers, diesel and nuclear, 
(compared with two operated by the United States). However, 
with the erosion of sea ice in the Arctic region in recent years, 
summertime use of the NSR is being viewed as more viable, 
providing both challenges and opportunities for Russia, and 
the possibility of another important trade route for China. 
Russia has made greater use of the NSR for its own ships. For 
example the tanker Vladimir Tikhonov traversed the route in 
August 2001, becoming the largest vessel of its type to do so. 
Two months later, a second tanker completed the run, and in 
late 2012, the Reka Ob, under contract by the Russian energy 
firm Gazprom, navigated the NSR from Hammerfest, Norway 
to the Japanese port of Tobata in twenty-eight days, with a 
shipment of liquefied natural gas.3  In total, seventy-one ships 
traversed the NSR in its entirety during 2013, compared with 
forty-six in 2012 and only four in 2010. According to Rus-
sian sources, the possibility exists of a thirty-fold increase in 
shipping by 2020 with the prospect of an ice-free NSR route 
by 2050. Until that time however, ice and weather conditions 
would prevent the NSR from achieving anything comparable 
to the same level of use as waterways further south. The year 
2014 presented a sobering reminder of the limits of the NSR, 
since during that year only thirty-one ships completed the 
run due to suboptimal conditions. 
The opening up of the NSR may also have strategic and 
legal repercussions for Moscow, especially in the area of 
maritime sovereignty. During the first two presidential terms 
of Vladimir Putin between 2000 and 2008, Russian Arctic 
policy began to assume greater importance, with Moscow 
re-asserting its security interests in the region. For example, 
in September 2013 Moscow announced routine naval patrols 
would be undertaken in northern Siberian waters, shortly 
after a flotilla led by the Russian heavy cruiser Pyotr Velikiy 
completed passage through the Arctic Ocean via the NSR. 
This was followed in August 2014 with the first overflights 
of the NSR region by Sukhoi Su-34 fighter jets. A month later, 
a second Russian naval flotilla led by the destroyer Admiral 
Levchenko commenced a run from the northern Russian port 
of Severomorsk, near Murmansk, to deliver supplies and 
personnel to a newly-reopened base in the New Siberian 
Islands in eastern Siberia. Also during September, the Rus-
sian Defence Ministry announced that two bases would be 
re-established at Wrangel Island and Cape Schmidt, both 
located in the Chukchi Sea region near Alaska.
The economic possibilities of the NSR, as a third potential 
‘road’ linking East Asia to Europe, is of increasing interest 
to Beijing given its potential value in reducing time and fuel 
costs for its vessels traveling to European markets. For exam-
ple, if a given vessel traveling from Shanghai to Hamburg used 
the NSR, the voyage would be approximately 6400 kilometres 
shorter than using the common shipping lanes in the Indian 
Ocean which include the Malacca Straits and Suez Canal.4 
Future scenarios for China’s use of Arctic waterways, especially 
the Northeast Passage near Siberia, would very likely require 
maintaining warm relations between Beijing and Moscow. The 
bilateral energy deals announced between China and Russia 
in 2013-14 will likely play a part in the broader process, but 
there are other logistical issues involved in future Chinese use 
of the passage. Moscow stipulates that all foreign vessels tra-
versing the area must be escorted by a Russian icebreaker, for 
a considerable fee normally set at hundreds of thousands of 
US dollars, plus added insurance charges. 
Russia is aware of the economic potential of greater num-
bers of Asian, including Chinese, vessels seeking to make 
use of the NSR during summer months, and has begun to 
plan accordingly. The Putin government has been seeking 
to upgrade its icebreaker capability, including launching 
the largest nuclear-powered icebreaker in the world, the 
50 Let Pobedy, in 2007.5 As well, there is the potential for 
additional costs for Arctic shipping in light of the Polar Code 
negotiations led by the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) to develop minimum safety and environmental stand-
ards for ships in the region. 
Nonetheless, Beijing demonstrated its commitment to par-
ticipating in the future economic opening up of the NSR for 
commercial shipping in August-September 2013 when the 
Chinese cargo vessel Yongsheng (永盛) sailed from the port of 
Dalian to Rotterdam in thirty-three days via the Arctic route, 
saving approximately two weeks of transit time. The event 
marked the first time a container vessel made the journey, 
and emphasised both the viability of the passage for Chinese 
and Asian shipping and China’s growing maritime prowess. 
It was suggested during comments by the head of the Polar 
Research Institute of China (PRIC) in March 2013 that five 
3 ‘Gazprom Successfully Completes World’s First LNG Supply via North-
ern Sea Route,’ Gazprom, 5 December 2012, < http://www.gazprom.
com/press/news/2012/december/article150603/>.
4 Marc Lanteigne, China’s Emerging Arctic Strategies: Economics and 
Institutions (Reykjavík: Centre for Arctic Policy Research, University 
of Iceland, 2014).
5 Michael Byers, ‘The (Russian) Arctic is Open for Business,’ Globe and 
Mail, 12 August 2013.
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to fifteen percent of Chinese international trade could make 
use of the Arctic by 2020, a figure representing an estimated 
US$600 billion. Even if that figure proves optimistic, the NSR 
may well be of significant importance to China’s trade inter-
ests. Much will hinge on future Sino-Russian diplomatic and 
economic relations. Yet despite difficult relations between 
Moscow and Europe in the wake of the Ukraine issue, and as 
Russia hopes to develop its Asia pivot and likely make use of 
the Silk Road plans by Beijing, misgivings by the Putin gov-
ernment about China’s role in the Arctic may ease.
Conclusions and Recommendations
• Although the number of ships making the run across the 
NSR appeared set to decrease in 2014, its usefulness to East 
Asia and especially Chinese interests is unlikely to abate 
given the ongoing requirement for faster, less expensive 
trade routes between Europe and Asia. Beijing’s announce-
ments of the ‘Silk Road’ initiatives are the strongest indi-
cation yet that China will remain focussed on exports as 
a primary means of growing its economy and continuing 
the still-tenuous economic reform process under President 
Xi. The question will be to determine the specific benefits 
for those states and economies located along these transit 
routes, as well as on the NSR. Russia and the Central Asia 
/ Caucasus regions would be among the main beneficiaries 
of expanded Eurasian trade, thus questioning the effects 
on these central regions, including the RFE. 
• There is the issue of how Europe will respond to these 
‘new roads’ proposed by Beijing. The benefits for 
European states may be great, given ongoing Chinese 
demands for European products as well as Europe’s 
continued position as a purchaser of Chinese goods. 
Much will depend on Europe’s economic health in the 
coming years and its ability to address China’s growing 
economic power. Beijing has signed two free trade agree-
ments with non-EU states, Iceland and Switzerland, and 
appears ready to deepen its relations with other European 
partners. The Silk Roads and the NSR may contribute 
greatly to the engagement process between Europe and 
China, and must be a source of further economic study. 
Just as the timetable for the land and sea Silk Roads are 
an open question, the expanded use of the NSR may also 
require a considerable adjustment period given the still-
difficult travel conditions, even in the summer months, 
and ongoing global economic uncertainty which has 
depressed energy and resource prices, reducing  enthusi-
asm for a potential Arctic bonanza in the coming years. 
Nevertheless, the opening of the NSR, even at a gradual 
pace, appears ready to create new possibilities for Chinese 
and Russian cooperation, and it will be up to the interna-
tional community, including Europe, to take notice. 
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